Reforming the Irish Public Service: A Multiple Streams Perspective by MacCarthaigh, Muiris
Reforming the Irish Public Service: A Multiple Streams Perspective
MacCarthaigh, M. (2017). Reforming the Irish Public Service: A Multiple Streams Perspective. Administration,
6(2). DOI: 10.1515/admin-2017-0019
Published in:
Administration
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal
Publisher rights
Copyright the author 2017.
This is an open access article published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits distribution and reproduction for non-commercial purposes, provided the
author and source are cited.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:06. Nov. 2017
Administration, vol. 65, no. 2 (2017), pp. 145–164
doi: 10.1515/admin-2017-0019
Reforming the Irish public service: 
A multiple streams perspective
Muiris MacCarthaigh
Queen’s University Belfast
Abstract
Following the Irish general election of 2011, a new ministry emerged which
sought to combine public expenditure, industrial relations and public sector
reform. The creation of the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform
(DPER) represented a major departure in Irish administrative history, not
least because it introduced a new actor at the heart of Irish government, but
also for the range of tasks with which it was endowed. This article provides an
administrative reform context for the creation of DPER before examining its
work across three domains: industrial relations, financial management reform
and administrative reform. Drawing on Kingdon’s ‘multiple streams’ model of
policy change, the article argues that reform efforts across all three were made
possible by the ‘window of opportunity’ presented by the department’s
creation and the coming together of problems, policies and politics in respect
of public service reform. 
Keywords: Ireland, public administration, global financial crisis, public service
reform, multiple streams
Introduction
A decade has passed since the onset of the global financial crisis, yet
many governments across Europe still struggle to stabilise their
budgets, reduce public debt and grow their economies. There has been
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considerable diversity in how governments have responded to the
crisis (see Bideleux, 2011; Kickert, 2012; Peters et al., 2011), with many
(including Ireland) requiring external interventions. However,
programmes of administrative reform and cutback management have
been common responses and remain important elements of
retrenchment strategies likely to continue for some time (Coen &
Roberts, 2012; Lodge & Hood, 2012; Peters, 2011; Pollitt, 2010;
Thynne, 2011). How these bureaucratic reform measures have been
managed and institutionalised has varied according to administrative
tradition, the scale of the crisis and political circumstance (Hardiman
& MacCarthaigh, 2016). 
The use of departmental ministries is a particularly prominent
method of demonstrating political commitment to a policy field or
problem. In the context of the Irish general election of 2011, in which
promises of substantial political and administrative reform formed
part of the manifestos of all major parties, a new ministry emerged
which sought to combine public expenditure, industrial relations and
public sector reform. The creation of the Department of Public
Expenditure and Reform (DPER) represented a major departure in
Irish administrative history, not least because it introduced a major
new actor at the heart of Irish government, but also for the range of
tasks with which it was endowed. This article begins by providing an
administrative reform context for the creation of DPER before
examining its work across three domains: industrial relations, financial
management reform and administrative reform. Following this, and
drawing on Kingdon’s (1995) ‘multiple streams’ model of policy
change, the paper argues that reform efforts across all three were
made possible by the ‘window of opportunity’ presented by the
department’s creation and the coming together of problems, policies
and politics in respect of public service reform. 
A multiple streams approach to policy change
Many approaches exist for conceptualising policy change in
government (Cairney, 2012; John, 2012). One such approach is the
‘multiple streams’ model proposed by John Kingdon (1995) in his
seminal work on policy agendas in the US. In this book, he argued that
policy did not develop in a linear process involving problem
identification, development of options and then a choice made by a
political principal. Rather, he proposed a ‘multiple streams’ frame -
work, suggesting that change only occurred within the ‘policy primeval
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soup’ (1995, p. 117) when there was a confluence of streams: problem
streams, policy streams and political streams. When these streams
were aligned, it presented a ‘window of opportunity’ for reform that
might otherwise not be possible. Timing is therefore important for the
multiple streams approach, as is the emphasis on the ability of non-
elites to influence policy.
Windows of opportunity do not have agency; rather, they are
exploited by what Kingdon calls ‘policy entrepreneurs’. Such
entrepreneurs have the capacity, knowledge and incentive to use the
window to advance their own policy goals. Examples might include
bureaucrats and political elites, but also organised civil society groups
or other actors in positions of authority. In all cases, these
entrepreneurs are aware of the potential for change offered by the
window of opportunity, and have the resources to exploit it
independently or through collaboration. Building on this work,
Herweg et al. (2015) particularly emphasise the policy role played by
political parties in creating and exploiting these windows of
opportunity. 
Although it has clear limitations in terms of hypothesis-testing, in
respect of public service reform, a multiple streams approach is
particularly useful for conceptual understanding of why significant
reform efforts occur occasionally rather than continuously, and why
some reforms are chosen over others. Indeed, as Zahariadis (2016)
identifies, the popularity of a multiple streams approach is due to its
role in explaining change under conditions of ambiguity. In the case of
Ireland, the series of crises beginning in 2008 led to considerable
policy ambiguity and uncertainty, which were used to good effect by
those adopting the ‘never waste a crisis’ mantra upon coming to power
following a general election in 2011. Before examining the incidence
and content of these reforms, the context of the administrative
reforms prior to 2011 must be presented.
Administrative reform prior to 2011
From late 2008 until 2014, two successive Irish governments engaged
in a series of austerity budgets in which public spending contracted
rapidly. These budgets were necessitated by the combined banking,
financial and economic crises which began in 2008 (Donovan &
Murphy, 2013; Whelan, 2014). Amongst other issues, a number of
official reports commissioned in the aftermath of the crises pointed to
a lack of timely critical debate and analysis by bank analysts and the
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public at large, aligned with a sense of complacency within govern -
ment and other authorities (Regling & Watson, 2010; Nyberg, 2011).
A report into the role of the powerful Department of Finance made
particular reference to the issue of public service reform: 
Some significant strides have been made in the area of Public
Service Modernisation, particularly on improved electronic and
other services to the public. However progress on Public Service
Modernisation generally has been very disappointing. The
Department of Finance must bear its share of the responsibility
for this. The Department has not prioritised Public Service
Modernisation, and has devoted limited resources to the area.
(Wright, 2010, p. 38)
Public service reform had been a vexed issue for years, with
responsibility divided between the two key ministries at the heart of
Irish government – the Department of Finance and the Department of
the Taoiseach (Prime Minister). With administrative reform
remaining largely outside of ideological or partisan politics, Ireland
was considered a laggard in respect of the managerial reform trends
that occurred in other Westminster–Whitehall bureaucracies during
the 1980s and 1990s (Hardiman & MacCarthaigh, 2011). In fact, on
the eve of the crisis, the Irish government was handed the final report
of a study it had commissioned the OECD to undertake, which sought
widespread reform of the public service. Titled Ireland: Towards an
Integrated Public Service, the OECD described a bureaucracy beset by
institutional fragmentation, weak coordination and poor
performance-management practices. It suggested that since the early
1990s, ‘Ireland has significantly advanced along a “New Public
Management” continuum’ (OECD, 2008, p. 18), without detailing what
this continuum comprised. It presented a list of reform ideas which
majored on better coordination and a performance-based culture, but
which in the face of the financial crisis disappeared from the agenda as
economic stability took precedence. However, many of the reform
ideas within the OECD’s report, including those around shared
services and performance budgeting, were to re-emerge within a
number of years.
As the budgetary situation deteriorated in 2008, talk of reform gave
way to ‘efficiency’ cuts in public services, including public pay. A
moratorium on public service recruitment, which had been put in
place in 2007, was extended. And in the aftermath of a controversial
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blanket banking guarantee in September 2008 (Whelan, 2014), an
early ‘emergency’ budget for 2009 was published in October 2008,
which prohibited any increases in public spending. A Special Group on
Public Service Numbers and Expenditure Programmes, led by
prominent economist Colm McCarthy, conducted a ‘stocktaking’
exercise, which identified €5.3 billion in savings and recommended a
reduction in public service personnel of about 5 per cent. Considered
drastic at the time, later cuts of over €20 billion and a reduction in
public service numbers of almost 10 per cent would result. 
The Irish economy continued to deteriorate during 2009, and the
budget for 2010 introduced another, slightly less severe round of
expenditure cuts, including pay reductions (on a tiered basis) and
changes to pension entitlements for public servants. As a result of
these measures, as well as incentivised schemes for early retirement
and career breaks, the gross rates of public service pay were reduced
by about 14 per cent cumulatively over 2009 and 2010. It was still
insufficient to stabilise the public finances, however, and the
government was eventually forced to agree a loan package with the
‘troika’ of the International Monetary Fund, the European Central
Bank and the European Commission in December 2010. The troika
package was dependent on a programme of economic reforms which
the government would undertake under the terms of the loan, and was
titled the National Recovery Plan 2011–2014 (Government of Ireland,
2010). And though the agreement was silent on the detail of public
service reform measures, the troika accepted proposals for reform of
the Irish budgetary and financial management framework, including
stronger links between expenditure and performance measurement.
Achieving the targets set by the troika was also linked to reform efforts
that emphasised the need for efficiencies in public spending.
The creation of DPER
Within weeks of signing the loan programme memorandum with the
troika, the coalition government that had been elected in 2007, and
that had weathered over two years of ad hoc cuts and reform
measures, disintegrated and an election was called for February 2011.
The issues of political and administrative reform formed an important
part of the election campaign, with all major parties presenting lists of
proposed reform measures in their manifestos to the electorate. The
election result delivered a combined total of 113, or 68 per cent of,
seats in the lower house for a coalition of centre-right Fine Gael and
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centre-left Labour Party, and thus a significant mandate for reform.
The programme for government subsequently adopted by the new
administration set out an ambitious agenda of ‘whole of government’
reforms, ranging from abolishing the upper house of parliament and
the secondary tier of Irish local government (town and borough
councils) to new public service data-sharing and public procurement
regimes (Government of Ireland, 2011). To manage these reforms, the
new government made an important institutional innovation, which
was to create a new ministry – DPER – and, in so doing, to break up
the traditional duopoly at the heart of Irish government between the
Department of Finance and the Department of the Taoiseach. 
The new department took functions from both, though principally
the public expenditure sections from the Department of Finance, and
combined in one organisation the issues of public sector reform,
industrial relations and expenditure management. As well as reducing
the power of the Department of Finance, the decision to create the
new department also solved a political problem by allowing for the
smaller coalition partner to have two major cabinet positions, and to
have co-equal status at the Economic Management Council (see
below). The process of developing the legislation to give the new
department authority was an enormous one, involving a trawl of all
primary and secondary legislation since the foundation of the state
relating to the functions of the Minister for Finance and distributing
the functions between DPER and Finance. The latter department was
left to focus on budgetary and macroeconomic issues, including
taxation, as well as reform of the damaged banking sector. Apart from
its unique combination of roles, DPER was distinctive in the
composition of its management board, which brought together a
cohort of senior managers from outside as well as within the public
service, and in its use of non-conventional (for the civil service)
managerial titles such as chief operations officer, chief information
officer and various director roles. And in a break from pre-crisis
practice, senior officials with considerable private sector experience
were recruited to manage large reform projects in such areas as shared
services and procurement (MacCarthaigh, 2014b). 
With the crisis providing a ‘window of opportunity’, DPER
provided the necessary institutional means for a number of policy
entrepreneurs to address new but also long-standing policy problems
related to public service reform. The Minister for Public Expenditure
and Reform, Brendan Howlin, TD, had long-standing interests around
aspects of political and administrative reform, and was able to pursue
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these not just through his department but also with the support of key
political fora (see below). The new senior cadre of officials in his
department were also presented with the means (primarily
expenditure controls, but also a strong political mandate) to address
policy problems around administrative reform that had evaded
previous administrations. 
As well as assuming responsibility for the annual financial and
budgetary process, DPER therefore developed two whole-of-
government public service reform plans which encapsulated the policy
solutions it wished to implement (Department of Public Expenditure
and Reform, 2011, 2014). In terms of ensuring that the reform plans
were implemented beyond central government, a new oversight and
reporting structure was created. At the apex, a cabinet sub-committee
on public sector reform was created, chaired by the Taoiseach, which
provided a key mechanism for overcoming any internal bureaucratic
barriers to reform. It also served to firmly link administrative reform
with the national economic recovery effort. 
DPER was also represented in a new powerful decision-making
forum within the cabinet, known as the Economic Management
Council (EMC). The EMC consisted of the Taoiseach, the Tánaiste,
and the Ministers for Finance and Public Expenditure and Reform, as
well as their top officials and economic advisers. The EMC’s role was
to manage reforms related to the troika loan programme, and to
provide for faster executive decision-making. The EMC’s approval of
DPER’s public service reform agenda as part of the national response
to the economic crisis gave it further political authority for
implementation. 
Industrial relations
Prior to the crisis, public sector pay and reform was negotiated
through triennial ‘social partnership’ agreements between govern -
ment, trade unions, business and farming interests (and later a social
or ‘community and voluntary sector’ pillar) that had been a feature of
public policymaking since 1987. In the context of the economic crisis,
the multi-actor social partnership process fell apart, and instead the
government negotiated directly with public service unions alone.1
Following negotiations, a new deal titled the Public Service Agreement
2010–2014 was agreed at the end of March 2010. 
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Popularly known as the Croke Park Agreement, the key provisions
were:
• no further public service pay cuts until at least 2014;
• significant cost-saving reform measures to be implemented across
the public service;
• a review in spring 2011 of the extent of savings generated to
determine any scope for the reversal of pay cuts;
• a reduction in public service staff numbers; 
• no compulsory redundancies but flexible redeployment
arrangements to be introduced;
• creation of a unified public service labour market;
• promotion and incremental progression to be based on
performance;
• an industrial peace clause to be put in place.
The agreement, and the associated detailed monitoring programme,
provided a vital platform for introducing changes to work practices at
the local organisational level that had previously proved resistant to
reform plans under social partnership agreements. Significantly, it
contained proposals that had featured in pre-crisis reform initiatives
(particularly around performance and mobility) but that had not been
achieved through the social partnership process. In the context of
potential job losses and further pay cuts, public servants agreed to
engage in these reforms (including longer working hours, reductions
to leave and cancellation of pay increases) over the period of the
agreement. The new government which came to power in early 2011
initially agreed to honour its terms. However, by the end of 2012 it
became increasingly clear that the pay bill was still too large to achieve
the targets set by the troika. DPER engaged with other departments
to identify agreed positions for negotiations with public service unions,
undertook necessary preparations and represented the government in
negotiations. Thus, it presented a singular voice for dealing with all
licensed unions across the public service.
Formal negotiations between the government and unions took
place in January 2013 on a new pay deal. Although the draft of an early
deal was rejected by unions, agreement was eventually reached on the
Public Service Stability Agreement 2013–2016 (popularly known as the
Haddington Road Agreement), which was signed by both parties in
May 2013 and superseded the Croke Park Agreement. As part of the
new agreement, a final round of graduated cuts (ranging from 5.5 to
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10 per cent) to those on higher salaries (over €65,000) were made in
order to secure savings of a further €1 billion by 2015. In contrast with
the Croke Park Agreement, which had envisaged a global savings
target, the Haddington Road Agreement had a more defined set of
reform measures, each with associated target savings. In effect, DPER
had been able to use consultation under conditions of economic
duress to achieve specific reforms that negotiations had conspicuously
failed to achieve in the past (Hardiman & MacCarthaigh, 2011). 
By late 2014, and in the context of improving economic conditions,
unions began to seek a reversal of the deep cuts to pay and pensions
that had occurred since 2008. In expectation of a pay claim in early
2015 from the unions, DPER began looking at a strategy for a new
round of pay negotiations, including consideration of what pay
increases could be facilitated when the terms of the Haddington Road
Agreement ended in mid 2016. The department was keen that reforms
which enabled containment of payroll costs across the system be
secured, and that there would be no reversal of the productivity
changes in place arising from the Croke Park and Haddington Road
deals. Unlike the Croke Park and Haddington Road Agreements,
which had been negotiated over months, there was a desire on the part
of both DPER and the unions to have a very short negotiation period.
In the event, what became known as the ‘Lansdowne Road
Agreement’ took just three weeks to negotiate, and a final deal was
agreed in May 2015. Formally titled the Public Service Stability
Agreement 2013–2018, it extended the Haddington Road Agreement
by two years and began the process of ‘unwinding’ the legislative
provisions that had been used to implement cuts to pay and pensions
since 2008. By the end of the government’s term, industrial peace had
been largely maintained in the public sector during a period of
extraordinary challenge. As the economy improved through 2016,
however, pressure for speedier unwinding of cuts led to a new
government, elected in May, agreeing to the establishment of an
independent Commission on Public Sector Pay, taking the task out of
DPER’s hands. DPER was content to divest itself of this role and to
depoliticise the issue as much as possible. 
As Figure 1 identifies, the period after 2008 witnessed a contraction
in public service numbers of approximately 10 per cent, surpassing a
2014 target set by the troika in 2010. While the effects were successful
in reducing the pay bill (without industrial action), by 2015 it had
created an unusual demographic profile for the public service, with
few staff under thirty years of age or over sixty. The nature of
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recruitment also began to change, with all senior public service
positions open to external recruitment, a position that had been
resisted by unions prior to the crisis. Furthermore, when general
recruitment restarted in 2015, it was for more position-based and
skilled appointments rather than for a continuation of the generalist
character that had existed prior to the crisis.
Figure 1: Irish public service numbers by sector 2006–14 (including
2014 target agreed with troika in 2010)
Source: DPER Databank (http://databank.per.gov.ie), Government of Ireland
(2010, p. 64).
Financial management reform
Combined, the Croke Park, Haddington Road and Lansdowne Road
Agreements were essential in the implementation of major reform
efforts, particularly those concerning financial management reforms.
The scale of the Irish financial and economic crisis resulted in
considerable criticism of the state’s budgetary and financial manage -
ment processes. There were two interrelated frameworks for their
reform. Firstly, Irish budgetary reforms were heavily influenced by
changes initiated at the European level, including the stronger
‘preventive’ and ‘corrective’ dimensions of budgetary policy for
member states. Secondly, budgetary reforms were shaped by the three-
year loan programme memorandum agreed with the troika, which
committed the state to a number of initiatives in respect of budgetary
and financial management.
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In line with other EU states, from 2013, budget day was moved
forward from December to mid October. The Irish government was
also obliged to produce a Stability Programme Update, identifying
aggregate fiscal plans and related macroeconomic projections for the
forthcoming budget year and into the medium term. The government
passed the Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2012, to provide for its EU
obligations under the Fiscal Compact, which was adopted in 2012. A
centrepiece of the act was to legislate for the Irish Fiscal Advisory
Council (IFAC), which had been created on a provisional basis in July
2011. The legislation assigned IFAC the power to assess and monitor
the forecasts of the Department of Finance, compliance with
European budgetary rules and the general appropriateness of the
government’s fiscal stance. It is also mandated to comment publicly on
whether the government is meeting its budgetary targets and
objectives. 
Arising from the troika agreement, in March 2011 the Department
of Finance published Reforming Ireland’s Budgetary Framework: A
Discussion Document (Department of Finance, 2011). Demonstrating
their policy entrepreneurship, the reforms to the Irish public financial
management process were in fact those proposed by Irish officials in
2010 (who had developed them in response to the crisis) and
subsequently accepted by the troika. The proposed new budgetary
architecture involved considerable institutional reforms to the Irish
annual budgetary process, with a view to restoring Ireland’s
international credibility as well as better domestic fiscal governance
and budgetary outcomes. There were two major changes to the new
budgetary regime. The first was the introduction of multi-annual
expenditure ceilings. This was an attempt to switch from short-term
(annual) to medium-term (three-year) considerations of spending at
budget time. Once published, it was expected that subsequent annual
expenditure plans would respect these predefined ceilings for that
year. However, this change was formalised by administrative circular
rather than by legal statute – a shortcoming noted by the European
Commission in its country peer review of fiscal governance (European
Commission, 2013, p. 43). 
The second was the creation of a new performance reporting
regime. Under the Ministers and Secretaries (Amendment) Act, 2013,
all government departments were required to produce performance
statements, with a view to better alignment of decisions on spending
with policy outcomes. It also served the objective of providing
parliamentarians and the public with a clearer indication of how
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resources were being used. A series of policy results and performance
indicators were also developed for policy actions so that previously
separate documents for outputs, financial allocations and
performance information were more closely integrated. Three-year
trend information was also presented and a new public web-based
database called Ireland Stat (www.irelandstat.gov.ie) was created,
which provides information about government progress in achieving
policy goals.
In parallel with these changes, DPER undertook two ‘root-and-
branch’ Comprehensive Reviews of Expenditure, in 2011 and 2014.
Both involved a detailed analysis and assessment of all programmes of
expenditure, with all government departments required to identify
options for savings for the first review in 2011. The first review resulted
in the publication of the Comprehensive Expenditure Report 2012–14
alongside the coalition’s first budget, and a ‘whole-of-year’ approach
to budget development in line with EU requirements. Consistent with
the reformed public spending code, the second Comprehensive
Expenditure Report set out the multi-annual expenditure ceilings for all
‘votes’ for each of the years of 2015–17 inclusive. 
Finally, an important development in the government’s financial
and budget management reform was the creation of a new economic
service. The Irish Government Economic and Evaluation Service
(IGEES), housed in DPER, recruited graduate economists and, in
early 2014, began to publish its economic evaluations, exposing policy
development in a manner that was previously unusual for Irish
government. 
Bringing together public spending, industrial relations and public
sector reform for the first time in a single ministry provided the
necessary levers to ensure that financial and administrative reforms
would be linked to expenditure allocations (and pay) across the public
sector. However, in terms of budget-making, the decoupling of
revenue-raising and expenditure between departments may be
considered a concentration, rather than a diffusion, of authority. The
transfer of controls over spending to DPER led to greater
responsibility among fewer officials in that department, and thus a
centralisation of budgetary management, which is a common response
to crisis (Levine, 1979). However, the implementation of cuts was
operated in a decentralised manner, with departments given targets to
achieve not just in terms of personnel but also in terms of their
financial envelope for the year ahead. 
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Administrative reform
As noted above, DPER published two public service reform plans
during the 2011–16 period. The 2011 public service reform plan
contained fourteen key reform targets designed to deliver substantial
cost savings to the state, including: 
• reducing the public service pay bill by 15 per cent by 2015 (based on
2008 figures);
• reducing public service staff numbers by 37,500 to 282,500 by 2015
(from a peak of 320,000 in 2008);
• reducing the number of state agencies;
• standardising annual leave across the public service;
• improving data-sharing across the public service;
• reforming procurement;
• greater sharing of HR, payroll and pensions services across the civil
service;
• the potential for a ‘GovStat’ online initiative to be evaluated, to
provide more information about public service performance;
• greater use of performance management, for both organisations
and individuals.
As with the pay agreements signed with unions and the troika
programme, a number of the administrative reform proposals in
DPER’s public service reform plan had previously been voiced but
with little success. In particular, the recommendations of the pre-crisis
OECD review, and the subsequent Transforming Public Services
(Department of the Taoiseach, 2008) report, were influential and were
reintroduced (by means of the new plan) by senior officials in the
Department. In early 2012 the government approved a mandate for a
Reform and Delivery Office to create new structures across the main
sectors of the public service to implement the plan, which would report
to the cabinet sub-committee on public sector reform. These included
an Advisory Group of Secretaries General, chaired by the Secretary
General of DPER, and a Reform Board, involving a senior official
from each of the other fifteen government departments. A ‘senior
responsible officer’ was also identified, with responsibility to ensure
implementation of reform projects in the large spending sectors
(including Health, Education, Social Welfare). This level of oversight
had been missing from previous (pre-crisis) reform efforts, resulting in
reforms not being well coordinated or monitored. A number of major
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national administrative reform initiatives also took shape with DPER,
including the creation of a National Shared Service Office and the
Office of Government Procurement. In both cases, major cost savings
were sought through the amalgamation of functions common to many
public service organisations into single entities.
An important innovation that took shape during the latter half of
the government’s period in office was a project to renew a focus on
shared public service values and culture in a bottom-up manner. This
was developed through a series of innovative ‘town hall’ meetings of
civil servants across the state. In parallel, a study on the relationship
between ministers and top civil servants was conducted, with a view to
addressing long-standing concerns about the distribution of
accountability between political and administrative realms. These two
strands of work were integrated into a single report known as the Civil
Service Renewal Plan, which recommended change through twenty-five
actions across four themes:
i. a unified civil service, with the civil service operating more often as
a single organisation;
ii. a more professional service, with a greater emphasis on enhanced
performance of employees and organisations;
iii. a more responsive service, through changes in culture, structure
and process;
iv. a more open and accountable service, receptive to external ideas
and challenge.
Perhaps the most important feature of the plan, however, was that it
was signed by all secretaries general and launched at a high-profile
event in 2014 by the Taoiseach and Minister for Public Expenditure
and Reform, with all signatories present. Within DPER, a Renewal
Programme Development Office was created, with staff from other
departments coming to work in the office on secondment to help
embed the process in their department. 
In order to progress the plan’s actions, a number of new non-
statutory fora were created:
• A Civil Service Accountability Board, chaired by the Taoiseach,
which would have oversight of the implementation of crosscutting
priorities set by the government, and the capacity and capability of
the civil service. This latter role included the introduction of a
performance management system for secretaries general.
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• The creation of a Civil Service Management Board to manage the
performance and operation of the civil service, support the
government on the implementation of cross-departmental policy
initiatives, identify and manage strategic and operational risks, and
lead implementation of the Civil Service Renewal Plan. 
These accountability and management boards were also designed to
subject top civil servants to regular performance reviews, and to tackle
cross-government policy problems that had previously fallen foul of
departmental boundaries and accountability systems. The manage -
ment board in particular has played an important role in ensuring a
number of cross-departmental projects are being pursued by groups of
secretaries general in a manner that had previously eluded Irish
governments. Departmental capacity and capability reviews (which
had emerged prior to the crisis but were quickly wound up) were
reintroduced, which were to be published along with updates on the
implementation of recommended reforms. The plan also recom -
mended the development of a unified learning and development
strategy based on an assessment of future skills requirements in both
specialist and generalist areas. 
Another high-profile element of the administrative reform agenda
under DPER was a ‘rationalisation’ of the Irish administrative
system’s organisational profile. As Figure 2 identifies, the post-2008
period witnessed the first year-on-year reduction in the number of
public organisations in the history of the state. Initial ambitions for
large ‘culls’ or agency terminations turned out to be problematic in
practice (MacCarthaigh, 2014a), and achieved modest budgetary
savings, but a series of other reforms resulted in the nature of
department–agency relationships undergoing an important process of
change. Indeed, Dommet et al. (2016) find that agency governance in
Ireland now exhibits far greater levels of regulation than before the
crisis, including a shift away from periodic to more sustained
engagement in agency–department relationships. DPER was centrally
involved in these changes, including an emphasis on critical reviews of
each agency’s mandate, performance-based agreements between
agencies and parent departments, and the need for more robust
business cases for the creation of agencies than previously existed. 
Local authorities also experienced considerable rationalisation,
with associated budgetary cuts being very large compared to other
sectors of the bureaucracy, and a host of small sub-national agencies
being amalgamated or closed and their functions absorbed into local
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authorities. The network of 80 small municipal town and borough
councils ceased to exist after 2014. By 2015, the 114 elected sub-
national authorities that existed prior to the crisis had been reduced in
number to just 31. A review by Shannon found that of the 236 non-
elected local and regional bodies in existence in 2012, only 96 (or 41
per cent) were in place 4 years later (Shannon, 2016, p. 18).
DPER advanced modernisation and reform initiatives across a
range of other policy domains. These included the Irish public
service’s progress in relation to open data and data-sharing between
public bodies. Ireland joined the international Open Government
Partnership as part of this, and an Open Government Action Plan was
published in 2014. The development of professional pathways for
economists and HR specialists was also started within the department,
as well as more publicly accessible information on the performance of
government from Ireland Stat (see Downes et al., 2013). Legislation to
regulate protected disclosures (or ‘whistle-blowing’) and lobbying was
promulgated alongside extensions to the scope of the Office of the
Ombudsman and the freedom of information regime.
The views of public servants on the effects of these reforms are
revealing. A survey of senior Irish public executives published in 2014
found that 62 per cent felt the administrative system had improved
over the 2008–13 period, but the remaining 38 per cent felt that it had
deteriorated (Boyle, 2014, p. 35). When compared with other
European states, Irish respondents tended to be more positive in their
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Figure 2: Number of public organisations in Ireland (other than
ministerial departments), 1922–2014
Source: Hardiman et al. (2014).
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assessment of how the public service had performed over the previous
five years, particularly in respect of policy effectiveness, policy
coherence and coordination, cost and efficiency, external
transparency, and openness and ethical behaviour. However, the
results also found that Irish public service managers reported a
stronger deterioration with regard to citizen trust in government, the
attractiveness of the public sector as an employer and staff motivation
when compared with other states (Boyle, 2014, pp. 35–6).
Conclusions
The creation of DPER was a vital part of the Irish response to the
economic crisis and, alongside the creation of the EMC, was a major
institutional innovation of the Fine Gael/Labour Party coalition
government. The department also provided a focus for policy
entrepreneurs to pursue a range of reform measures that were
otherwise unlikely to have been implemented. Adopting a ‘never waste
a crisis’ approach, DPER was successful in introducing a wide range of
reform measures that left no part of the public service unaffected.
Many of these reforms, including shared services, performance
budgeting and greater mobility of personnel across the public service,
had been floated by the OECD’s (2008) pre-crisis report. However
other reforms, including the Civil Service Renewal Plan (and
subsequent Civil Service Accountability Board) and open government
initiatives, emerged uniquely from its work. The fact DPER was
maintained by the minority government elected in 2016, when it could
feasibly have been absorbed into the Department of Finance, is a
testament to the position it created for itself over the 2011–16 period. 
A multiple streams approach to the Irish public service reform
efforts over the post-crisis period helps to explain how, in response to
a perceived problem of an underperforming public service system, a
wide-ranging set of reform initiatives were pursued. And though the
outcome of each individual reform is beyond the scope of this paper,
the 2011–16 period became one of unprecedented change for the Irish
public service. The window of opportunity presented by the crisis was
exploited by policy entrepreneurs from the political and administrative
domains to implement major reform efforts in parallel.
The amalgamation of industrial relations with public expenditure
within DPER provided a potent force for implementing these reform
measures. And although the Croke Park Agreement was in place prior
to the department’s creation, the successor Haddington Road
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Agreement was a vital ‘enabler’ of major reform measures, including
harmonisation of terms and conditions of employment, which pro -
vided for productivity increases. The Lansdowne Road Agreement set
in motion the unwinding of crisis-era cuts, but by the end of the
coalition’s term of office, and in the context of economic improve -
ments, pressure mounted for an acceleration of the process. 
In terms of public expenditure, it remains to be seen if the reforms
have collectively and completely arrested the problematic ‘boom and
bust’ approach to public spending, and political pressures to spend
over budget limits remain strong. Despite a large underlying debt
arising from the Irish state guarantee of bank liabilities, improved
economic realities in 2015 and 2016 also resulted in pressure for
greater public spending and an end to ‘austerity’ measures. Thus, the
pre-crisis pattern of focusing on short-term spending has not
completely dissipated and the weight of influence exerted by new
bodies such as the IFAC and the IGEES remains uncertain. 
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